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Abstract
We study employment by lotto (Aldershof et al., 1999), a procedurally fair matching algorithm
for the so-called stable marriage problem. We complement Aldershof et al.’s (1999) analysis
in two ways. First, we give an alternative and intuitive description of employment by lotto in
terms of a probabilistic serial dictatorship on the set of stable matchings. Second, we show
that Aldershof et al.’s conjectures are correct for small matching markets but not necessarily
correct for large matching markets.
Keywords: employment by lotto, probabilistic mechanism, two-sided matching, stability.
1 Introduction
The so-called marriage model is concerned with (two-sided, one-to-one) matching markets where
the two sides of the market, for instance, are firms and workers. A matching is then a partition
of all firms and workers into pairs and unmatched firms and/or workers. Such a matching is
“stable” if each firm and worker has an acceptable match, and no firm and worker prefer one
another to their respective matches. Gale and Shapley (1962) were the first to formalize this
notion of stability and provide an algorithm to calculate stable matchings. Their results inspired
many researchers to study stability and its importance for real-life matching markets; see Roth
and Sotomayor (1990) for an excellent survey.
An important property of the set of stable matchings is its lattice structure and, as a con-
sequence, the polarization between stable matchings. In particular, there always exists a best
stable matching for firms (workers) which is at the same time the worst stable matching for
the workers (firms). Using Gale and Shapley’s (1962) deferred acceptance algorithm both op-
timal matchings can be easily calculated. However, by choosing optimal stable matchings one
side of the market is clearly favored over the other side. Masarani and Gokturk (1989) showed
several impossibilities to obtain a fair deterministic matching mechanism within the context of
Rawlsian justice based on cardinal preference information. One way to recover fairness is to use
probabilistic (stable) matching mechanisms that are ex ante fair and/or ‘procedurally fair;’ see
for instance Aldershof et al. (1999), Klaus and Klijn (2006), and Ma (1996).
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In this paper we focus on employment by lotto, a probabilistic stable matching algorithm
introduced by Aldershof et al. (1999) to avoid the inherent favoritism explained above. Alder-
shof et al. (1999, p. 281) introduced employment by lotto as a new procedure that combines
a proposal algorithm and a refining process of the set of linear inequalities that describe the
set of stable matchings. Our first contribution is to propose an alternative and easy descrip-
tion/interpretation of employment by lotto. Loosely speaking, employment by lotto can be
considered to be a random serial dictatorship on the set of stable matchings. A first agent (a
firm or a worker)1 is drawn randomly and can discard all stable matchings in which it is not
matched to its best partner (possibly itself) in a stable matching. Exclude the first agent and
its partner from the set of agents and randomly choose the next agent who can discard all stable
matchings in which it is not matched to its best partner in the reduced set of stable matchings.
Continue with this sequential reduction of the set of stable matchings until it is reduced to a
singleton. Using all possible sequences of agents, this mechanism induces the same probability
distribution on the set of stable matchings as employment by lotto.
Our second contribution is to address Aldershof et al.’s (1999, p. 288) conjectures on a sym-
metry and a monotonicity property of the probability distribution induced by employment by
lotto. The first conjecture says that if the two sides of the market have the same cardinality
then the two extreme stable matchings are equiprobable. We prove that this is indeed true if
there are no more than three agents on each side of the market. We also show that for markets
with more than three agents on each side the conjecture is not necessarily true. The second
conjecture states that the probability distribution on the lattice of stable matchings is in some
sense unimodal. We show that there is a problem with Aldershof et al.’s (1999) implicit assump-
tion that the lattice can be partitioned in certain “natural” levels. Moreover, even for markets
where this problem does not arise, the probability distribution may not be unimodal. In all our
examples, we implement employment by lotto using Matlab c©.
The article is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the matching model. In
Section 3 we first recall Aldershof et al.’s (1999) definition of employment by lotto. Then,
we describe our alternative random “serial-dictatorship” mechanism and prove its equivalence
with employment by lotto. Finally, in Section 4 we present our results concerning Aldershof et
al.’s (1999) conjectures.
2 The Matching Model
There are two finite and disjoint sets of agents of equal size:2 a set F = {f1, . . . , fn} of firms
and a set W = {w1, . . . , wn} of workers. Thus, |F | = |W | = n and |F ∪W | = 2n. We denote a
generic agent by i, a generic firm by f , and a generic worker by w.
Each agent has a complete, transitive, and strict preference relation over the agents on
the other side of the market and the prospect of being alone. Hence, firm f ’s preferences
ºf can be represented as a strict ordering P (f) of the elements in W ∪ {f}, for instance:
P (f) = w3w2 f w1 . . . w4, which indicates that f prefers w3 to w2 and it prefers remaining
single to any other worker. Similarly, worker w’s preferences ºw can be represented as a strict
ordering P (w) of the elements in F ∪ {w}. Let P be the profile of all agents’ preferences:
P = (P (i))i∈F∪W .
1To avoid the distinction between genders “he, she, and it,” we simply refer to any agent as “it.”
2Employment by lotto (and our alternative description in Section 3) also applies to unequal sizes. We make
the assumption of equal size to simplify notation and because it is crucial for Aldershof et al.’s (1999) conjectures.
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We write wÂfw′ if f strictly prefers w to w′ (w 6= w′), and wºfw′ if f likes w at least as
well as w′ (wÂfw′ or w = w′). Similarly we write fÂwf ′ and fºwf ′. A worker w is acceptable
to a firm f if wÂfm. Analogously, a firm f is acceptable to a worker w if fÂww. Also, any
agent is acceptable to itself.
A matching market is a triple (F,W,P ). A matching for (F,W,P ) is a function µ : F ∪
W → F ∪ W such that for all f ∈ F and w ∈ W it holds that µ(f) = w ⇔ µ(w) = f ,
µ(f) 6∈W ⇒ µ(f) = f , and µ(w) 6∈ F ⇒ µ(w) = w. If µ(f) = w, then firm f and worker w are
matched to one another. If µ(i) = i, then agent i is single. We call µ(i) the match of agent i at
µ. When denoting a matching µ we list the workers that are matched to firms f1, f2, . . .; e.g.,
µ = w3, w4, f3, w1 denotes a matching where f1 is matched to w3, f2 to w4, f3 to itself, and f4
to w1. Alternatively, a matching is denoted as a collection of matched agents and single agents;
e.g., {(f1, w3), (f2, w4), (f4, w1), f3, w2} denotes matching µ = w3, w4, f3, w1.
A key property of matchings is stability. First, since agents can always choose to be single,
we require individual rationality: all matches are acceptable, i.e., for all i ∈ F ∪W , µ(i)ºii.
Second, if an agent can improve upon its present match by switching to another agent such
that this agent is better off as well, then this blocking clearly would cause instability. For a
given matching µ, a firm-worker pair (f, w) is a blocking pair if they are not matched to one
another but prefer one another to their current match at µ, i.e., wÂfµ(f) and fÂwµ(w). A
matching is stable if it is individually rational and if there are no blocking pairs. In view of
stability, we henceforth denote a preference list, or list for short, by its list of acceptable agents.
For instance, P (f) = w3w2 f w1 . . . w4 is denoted by P (f) = w3w2 f . With a slight abuse of
notation, we denote the set of stable matchings for matching market (F,W,P ) by S(P ). Gale
and Shapley (1962) proved that S(P ) 6= ∅. Furthermore, any set of stable matchings has the
structure of a (distributive) lattice, which we explain next.
For any two matchings µ and µ′ we define the function λ := µ ∨F µ′ on F ∪W that assigns
to each firm its more preferred match from µ and µ′ and to each worker its less preferred
match: for all f ∈ F , λ(f) := µ(f) if µ(f)Âfµ′(f) and λ(f) := µ′(f) otherwise, and for all
w ∈ W , λ(w) := µ(w) if µ′(w)Âwµ(w) and λ(w) := µ′(w) otherwise. Similarly, the function
µ∧F µ′ assigns to each firm its less preferred and to each worker its more preferred match. The
following theorem (published by Knuth, 1976, but attributed to John Conway) establishes the
lattice structure of the set of stable matchings.
Theorem 2.1 [Lattice Theorem] If µ, µ′ ∈ S(P ), then µ ∨F µ′, µ ∧F µ′ ∈ S(P ).
From Theorem 2.1 and the existence of a stable matching it follows easily that for any matching
market (F,W,P ) there is a stable matching µPF that is optimal for all firms in the sense that no
other stable matching µ gives to any firm f a match µ(f) that it prefers to µPF (f). Similarly,
there is a stable matching µPW that is optimal for all workers. In fact, Gale and Shapley (1962)
already proved the existence of µPF and µ
P
W by providing an algorithm, the deferred acceptance
algorithm, to calculate these matchings.
Since preferences are strict, the set of matched agents does not vary from one stable matching
to another (Roth, 1982), i.e., the set of single agents is the same for all stable matchings.
Theorem 2.2 For all i ∈ F ∪W and all µ, µ′ ∈ S(P ), µ(i) = i⇒ µ′(i) = i.
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3 Employment by Lotto
We first recall Aldershof et al.’s (1999) definition of employment by lotto. Next, we prove its
equivalence with our alternative and intuitive definition which describes employment by lotto
as a random serial dictatorship mechanism on the set of stable matchings.
Aldershof et al. (1999, p. 287) introduced employment by lotto as a new procedure that con-
sists of repeated and alternate application of (full runs of) a so-called refinement algorithm
and an adaptation of the set of linear inequalities that describe the set of stable matchings.
Aldershof et al. (1999, pp. 283-284) provide a rather technical description of their refinement
algorithm, but noticed (Aldershof et al., 1999, p. 286) that a full run of the algorithm is equiv-
alent to the construction of the profile of reduced preference lists described in Roth and So-
tomayor (1990, pp. 61-62). Therefore, instead of using the original definition of employment by
lotto, we take a short-cut by applying Roth and Sotomayor’s reduced preference lists.
RED(P) - Reduction of preference lists (Roth and Sotomayor, 1990, pp. 61-62):
Input: A matching market (F,W,P ).
Step 1: For all f , remove from f ’s list all w that are more preferred than µF (f).
Similarly, for all w, remove from w’s list all f that are more preferred than µW (w).
Step 2: For all f , remove from f ’s list all w that are less preferred than µW (f).
Similarly, for all w, remove from w’s list all f that are less preferred than µF (w).
Step 3: If worker w is not acceptable to firm f , then remove f from w’s list.
Similarly, if firm f is not acceptable to worker w, then remove w from f ’s list.
Output: A profile of reduced preference lists RED(P ).
A reduction of the preference lists does not alter the set of stable matchings.
Lemma 3.1 For any matching market (F,W,P ), if Q = RED(P ), then S(Q) = S(P ).
Proof: Follows from Roth and Sotomayor’s (1990) Proposition 3.10 with µ = µPW or µ = µ
P
F .2
Remark 3.2 Let (F,W,P ) be a matching market and letQ = RED(P ) be the profile of reduced
preferences. Note that for any f ∈ F , µPF (f) is the most preferred agent for Qf . Similarly, for
any w ∈ W , µPW (w) is the most preferred agent for Qw. By Lemma 3.1, µPF and µPW are also
stable for profile Q. Hence, µQF = µ
P
F and µ
Q
W = µ
P
W .
Using the reduced preference lists, Aldershof et al.’s (1999) definition of employment by lotto
boils down to the following procedure.
Algorithm I: Aldershof et al.’s (1999, p. 287) employment by lotto → EL∗(P)
Input: A matching market (F,W,P ). Set µ := ∅, N∗1 := F ∪W , Q1 := P , and t := 1.
Step t :
- Compute P t := RED(Qt).
- Choose an agent i∗t from N∗t at random.
- Match agent i∗t to its most preferred match ch∗(i∗t ) in P ti∗t by setting µ := µ ∪ {(i
∗
t , ch
∗(i∗t ))}.
- If N∗t \{i∗t , ch∗(i∗t )} = ∅, then set EL∗(P ) := µ and stop.
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Otherwise set N∗t+1 := N∗t \{i∗t , ch∗(i∗t )} and define Qt+1 by
a) setting Qt+1(i∗t ) := ch∗(i∗t )i∗t , i.e., ch∗(i∗t ) is the only acceptable agent for i∗t , and
b) for all i ∈ F ∪W\{i∗t }, Qt+1(i) := P t(i).
Go to Step t := t+ 1.
Since the set of agents is finite, Algorithm I ends in a finite number r∗ (n ≤ r∗ ≤ 2n) of steps.
As Aldershof et al. (1999) note, the outcome is a random stable matching EL∗(P ) ∈ S(P ),
generated by a sequence of agents (i∗1, . . . , i∗r∗). Let Q∗ be the set of such sequences and let
q∗ = |Q∗|. Moreover, for any µ ∈ S(P ), let Q∗µ ⊆ Q∗ be the (possibly empty) set of sequences
that lead to µ. Denote q∗µ = |Q∗µ|. Note that if all firms and workers are mutually acceptable,
then r∗ = n and q∗ = 2n · (2n− 2) · . . . · 2. Algorithm I induces in a natural way a probability
distribution P∗ = {p∗µ}µ∈S(P ) over the set of stable matchings: for any µ ∈ S(P ), the probability
that EL∗(P ) = µ equals p∗µ =
q∗µ
q∗ .
Below we give an alternative definition, which describes the employment by lotto algorithm as
a random serial dictatorship mechanism on the set of stable matchings.
Algorithm II: employment by lotto as a serial dictatorship → EL(P)
Input: A matching market (F,W,P ). Set N1 := F ∪W , S1 := S(P ), and t := 1.
Step t :
- Choose an agent it from Nt at random.
- Match agent it to its most preferred match ch(it) in {j : j = µ(it) for some µ ∈ St}.
- If Nt\{it, ch(it)} = ∅, then set {EL(P )} := St and stop.
Otherwise set Nt+1 := Nt\{it, ch(it)}, St+1 := {µ ∈ St : µ(it) = ch(it)}, and go to Step t := t+1.
Since the set of agents is finite, Algorithm II ends in a finite number r (n ≤ r ≤ 2n) of
steps. In fact, by Theorem 2.2, r only depends on the preferences (and hence all executions
of the algorithm end in r steps). It is clear that the outcome is a random stable matching
EL(P ) ∈ S(P ), generated by a sequence of agents (i1, . . . , ir). Let Q be the set of such sequences
and let q = |Q|. Moreover, for any µ ∈ S(P ), let Qµ ⊆ Q be the (possibly empty) set of sequences
that lead to µ. Denote qµ = |Qµ|. Note that if all firms and workers are mutually acceptable,
then r = n and q = 2n · (2n − 2) · . . . · 2. Algorithm II induces in a natural way a probability
distribution P = {pµ}µ∈S(P ) over the set of stable matchings: for any µ ∈ S(P ), the probability
that EL(P ) = µ equals pµ =
qµ
q .
Theorem 3.3 states that our alternative algorithm to define employment by lotto (Algorithm II)
is indeed equivalent to Aldershof et al.’s (1999) original algorithm (Algorithm I).
Theorem 3.3 For any matching market (F,W,P ) and any stable matching µ ∈ S(P ), p∗µ = pµ.
Proof: Let (F,W,P ) be a matching market. Note that any execution of Algorithm I gener-
ates a sequence of quadruples (N∗t , i∗t , S(P t), ch∗(i∗t )). Similarly, any execution of Algorithm II
generates a sequence of quadruples (Nt, it, St, ch(it)).
We prove the theorem by showing that the algorithms generate the same sequences and
that each sequence results in the same stable matching. In fact, we will show that for any
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sequence of quadruples (N∗t , i∗t , S(P t), ch∗(i∗t )) generated by an execution of Algorithm I there
is an execution of Algorithm II that generates a sequence of quadruples (Nt, it, St, ch(it)) such
that for each Step t ≥ 1 of Algorithm I:
(i) Nt = N∗t , and therefore we can indeed pick it = i∗t ,
(ii) St = S(P t), and
(iii) ch(it) = ch∗(i∗t ).
It can be proven in a very similar way that any sequence of Algorithm II corresponds to a
sequence of Algorithm I, and hence this is left to the reader.
Let (N∗t , i∗t , S(P t), ch∗(i∗t )) be a sequence of quadruples generated by an execution of Al-
gorithm I. We will show that there is exactly one execution of Algorithm II that generates a
sequence of quadruples (Nt, it, St, ch(it)) such that (i), (ii), and (iii) hold for each Step t ≥ 1 of
Algorithm I.
Step 1:
(1.i) Follows from the fact that both algorithms have as input F ∪W = N1 = N∗1 . Let i1 = i∗1.
(1.ii) Next, since in Algorithm I, P 1 = RED(Q1) = RED(P ), by Lemma 3.1, S(P 1) = S(P ).
In Algorithm II, S1 := S(P ). Hence, S1 = S(P 1).
(1.iii) In Algorithm I, ch∗(i∗1) = ch∗(i1) equals agent i1’s most preferred match in P 1i∗1 . Since
P 1 = RED(Q1) and Q1 = P , by Remark 3.2, ch∗(i∗1) is the most preferred match of agent i1 at
any matching in S(P ).
In Algorithm II, ch(i1) equals agent i1’s most preferred match in {j : j = µ(it) for some µ ∈
S1}. Since S1 = S(P ), ch(i1) is the most preferred match of agent i1 at any matching in S(P ).
Thus, ch(i1) = ch∗(i∗1).
Induction Hypothesis: We assume that (k.i), (k.ii), and (k.iii) hold for k = t− 1.
Step t :
(t.i) Since in Step t − 1, Nt−1 = N∗t−1, it−1 = i∗t−1, and ch(it−1) = ch∗(i∗t−1), we have
Nt = Nt−1\{it−1, ch(it−1)} = N∗t−1\{i∗t−1, ch∗(i∗t−1)} = N∗t . Hence, Nt = N∗t .
(t.ii) Since in Step t − 1, St−1 = S(P t−1), it−1 = i∗t−1, and ch(it−1) = ch∗(i∗t−1), we have
St = {µ ∈ St−1 : µ(it−1) = ch(it−1)} = {µ ∈ S(P t−1) : µ(i∗t−1) = ch∗(i∗t−1)}. Hence, it suffices
to prove that S(P t) = S(Qt) = {µ ∈ S(P t−1) : µ(i∗t−1) = ch∗(i∗t−1)}.
The first equality follows directly from Lemma 3.1 with P = Qt and Q = P t.
We prove the second equality in two steps. First let µ ∈ S(P t−1) be such that µ(i∗t−1) =
ch∗(i∗t−1). By construction of Qt, µ is individually rational for Qt. Suppose µ 6∈ S(Qt). Then
there is a blocking pair (f, w) for µ and Qt. By construction of Qt, (f, w) is a blocking pair for
µ and P t−1, a contradiction. Hence, µ ∈ S(Qt).
Finally, let µ ∈ S(Qt) = S(P t). We have to prove that µ(i∗t−1) = ch∗(i∗t−1) and µ ∈ S(P t−1).
We first prove that µ(i∗t−1) = ch∗(i∗t−1). Suppose without loss of generality that i∗t−1 ∈ W .
By construction, µP
t−1
W (i
∗
t−1) = ch∗(i∗t−1). Furthermore, µP
t−1
W ∈ S(P t−1) by definition and
µP
t−1
W ∈ S(Qt) by the construction of preference profile Qt out of P t−1 (recall that only agent
i∗t−1’s preferences are changed to make its most preferred match ch∗(i∗t−1) the only acceptable
agent – a preference change that does not affect the stability of µP
t−1
W ). Thus, there exists one
stable matching forQt at which agent i∗t−1 is matched to agent ch∗(i∗t−1). Hence, since ch∗(i∗t−1) is
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the only acceptable agent for i∗t−1 by Theorem 2.2 (with P = Qt), agents i∗t−1 and agent ch∗(i∗t−1)
are matched at all stable matchings in S(Qt) = S(P t). In particular, µ(i∗t−1) = ch∗(i∗t−1).
It remains to show that µ ∈ S(P t−1). Suppose to the contrary that µ 6∈ S(P t−1). By
construction of Qt, µ is individually rational for P t−1. So there is a blocking pair (f, w) for
µ and P t−1. Hence, wÂP t−1f µ(f) and fÂP
t−1
w µ(w).
3 We distinguish between the following two
cases:
Case (a): f, w 6= i∗t−1. Thus, Qtf = P t−1f and Qtw = P t−1w . Hence, wÂQ
t
f µ(f), fÂQ
t
w µ(w), and
(f, w) is also a blocking pair for µ and Qt, a contradiction.
Case (b): f = i∗t−1 or w = i∗t−1. Suppose without loss of generality that f = i∗t−1. Since (f, w)
is a blocking pair for µ and P t−1, wÂP t−1f µ(f) = µ(i∗t−1) = ch∗(i∗t−1). However, by definition,
ch∗(i∗t−1) is f ’s most preferred match in P
t−1
f , a contradiction.
(t.iii) Note that it = i∗t .
In Algorithm I, ch∗(i∗t ) = ch∗(it) equals agent it’s most preferred match in P tit . Since
P t = RED(Qt), by the definition of RED(Qt), ch∗(it) is the most preferred match of agent it
at any matching in S(Qt). Since S(Qt) = S(P t), ch∗(it) is the most preferred match of agent it
at any matching in S(P t).
In Algorithm II, ch(it) equals agent it’s most preferred match in {j : j = µ(it) for some µ ∈
St}. So, ch(it) is the most preferred match of agent it at any matching in St = S(P t).
Thus, ch(it) = ch∗(it) = ch∗(i∗t ). 2
Aldershof et al. (1999) observe that if a stable matching µ does not match any agent to its
firm/worker optimal match, then pµ = 0. More precisely, if for all i ∈ F ∪ W it holds that
µF (i) 6= µ(i) 6= µW (i), then pµ = 0. We demonstrate this characteristic of the EL algorithm
in the following example. In addition, we show how the example can be adjusted to prove
that the converse is not true, i.e., pµ = 0 does not necessarily imply that for all i ∈ F ∪W ,
µF (i) 6= µ(i) 6= µW (i).
Example 3.4 Let (F,W,P ) with n = 3 and P listed below.4 The three stable matchings for
this market are listed below as well. We depict the corresponding lattice in Figure 1.
Preferences Stable Matchings
P (f1) = w1 w2 w3 µW = w3 w2 w1
P (f2) = w3 w1 w2 µ˜ = w2 w1 w3
P (f3) = w2 w3 w1 µF = w1 w3 w2
P (w1) = f3 f2 f1
P (w2) = f2 f1 f3
P (w3) = f1 f3 f2
The nodes denote the stable matchings and the corresponding numbers are the probabilities
resulting from employment by lotto. The solid arcs denote comparability or unanimity on each
side of the market. For instance, µW → µ˜ in Figure 1 means that all workers weakly prefer their
matches at µW to their matches at µ˜ and all firms weakly prefer their matches at µ˜ to their
matches at µW .
3We add the index P t−1 to avoid any confusion.
4Note that in all our examples of matching markets all workers (firms) are acceptable to all firms (workers).
We do not have to rely on more general matching markets to prove our results. Furthermore, in order to save
space we do not depict the agent itself in an agent’s preference list.
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Figure 1: Lattice of Example 3.4
It is easy to check that whenever agent i1 in the EL algorithm is a firm, then EL(P ) = µF ,
and whenever agent i1 in the EL algorithm is a worker, then EL(P ) = µW . Hence, pµF =
1
2 =
pµW and pµ˜ = 0.
In order to show that pµ = 0 does not necessarily imply that for all i ∈ F∪W , µF (i) 6= µ(i) 6=
µW (i), we add two agents f4, w4 to the market above such that for all i = 1, 2, 3, 4, f4 Âf4 wi,
w4 Âw4 fi, and f4, w4 are placed anywhere in the preferences of the other agents. Then, for
stable matching µ = w2, w1, w3, f4, we have pµ = 0 and µ(f4) = µF (f4) and µ(w4) = µW (w4). ¦
Note that in order to compute the probability distribution that is induced by employment by
lotto, in general it is necessary to calculate the complete set of stable matchings. Gusfield and
Irving (1989, Section 3.5, pp. 121) provided a time- and space-optimal algorithm for enumerating
all stable matchings. Their algorithm needs O(n2 + n|∑(P )|) total time and O(n2) space.
4 Aldershof et al.’s Conjectures
Aldershof et al. (1999, p. 288) made the following conjectures about the probability distribution
P generated by employment by lotto over the set of stable matchings.
Conjecture 4.1 For any matching market, pµF = pµW .
Conjecture 4.2 “Consider a lattice of stable matchings for an instance of the stable matching
problem. All matchings with rank i have the same probability pi of resulting from employment
by lotto. Also the function f(i) = 1− pi is unimodal.”
The following two results show for which matching markets Conjecture 4.1 is correct and for
which matching markets it is not necessarily true.
Theorem 4.3 If n > 3, then not necessarily pµF = pµW .
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Proof: Let (F,W,P ) with n = 4 and P such that5
P (f1) = w1 w2 w3 w4
P (f2) = w2 w1 w4 w3
P (f3) = w3 w4 w1 w2
P (f4) = w4 w3 w2 w1
P (w1) = f4 f2 f3 f1
P (w2) = f3 f4 f1 f2
P (w3) = f2 f1 f4 f3
P (w4) = f1 f2 f3 f4.
There are seven stable matchings and for the firm and worker optimal matchings we find pµF =
2
8 6= 38 = pµW . (There are three other stable matchings with positive probability.) For n > 4 one
can simply add agents that find any other agent on the other side of the market unacceptable.2
Theorem 4.4 If n ≤ 3, then pµF = pµW .
Proof: From Theorem 2.2 it follows that the probability distribution on the set of stable
matchings does not change if we leave out all agents that are single in some (and hence all)
stable matching(s). In other words, in the EL algorithm we can take N1 := F ∪W\{i ∈ F ∪W :
µ(i) = i for some µ ∈ S(P )}. In order to simplify the proof, we assume that no agent is single
in any stable matching. Let P be any preference list for agents in F ∪W .
Case n = 1: Since µF (f1) = µW (f1) = w1, it follows immediately that pµF = pµW = 1.
Case n = 2: Clearly, S(P ) ⊆ {µ1(f1, f2) = (w1, w2), µ2(f1, f2) = (w2, w1)}. So, |S(P )| ≤ 2.
If |S(P )| = 1, then µF = µW , and hence, pµF = pµW = 1. If |S(P )| = 2, then the first agent
i1 in the EL algorithm being a firm or a worker determines the resulting matching, and hence,
pµF = pµW =
1
2 .
Case n = 3: If µF = µW , then pµF = pµW = 1. Thus, let µF 6= µW .
Subcase 1: pµF + pµW = 1. Let N = {i ∈ F ∪W : µF (i) 6= µW (i)}. Note that i ∈ N ∩ F
implies that there exist j, k ∈ N ∩W such that j 6= k. Similarly, i ∈ N ∩W implies that there
exist j, k ∈ N ∩ F such that j 6= k. Thus, |N ∩ F | = |N ∩W | ≥ 2. Hence, the set Q of EL
sequences is the union of the following disjoint sets
Q1µF = {(i1, i2, i3) ∈ Q : i1 ∈ N ∩ F},
Q1µW = {(i1, i2, i3) ∈ Q : i1 ∈ N ∩W},
Q2µF = {(i1, i2, i3) ∈ Q : i1 6∈ N, i2 ∈ N ∩ F}, and
Q2µW = {(i1, i2, i3) ∈ Q : i1 6∈ N, i2 ∈ N ∩W}.6
Note that Q1µF ∪Q2µF ⊆ QµF and Q1µW ∪Q2µW ⊆ QµW . Since |Q1µF | = |Q1µW | and |Q2µF | = |Q2µW |,
it follows that pµF = pµW =
1
2 .
Subcase 2: pµF + pµW < 1. There exists a stable matching µ 6∈ {µF , µW } with pµ > 0. Thus,
there exists a sequence (i1, i2, i3) ∈ Qµ. Therefore, either
(a) i1 ∈ F and µ(i1) = µF (i1) or
(b) i1 ∈W and µ(i1) = µW (i1).
5We switch the 2nd and 3rd position of agent w1’s preference in a matching market taken from Knuth (1976).
6Note that |Q2µF | = |Q2µW | = 0 if and only if |N ∩ F | = |N ∩W | = 3.
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We consider Case (a) (Case (b) is proven similarly). Without loss of generality let i1 = f1.
First we show that at matching µ at most one firm can be matched to its firm optimal match.
Assume there exist i, j ∈ F , i 6= j such that µ(i) = µF (i) and µ(j) = µF (j). Then, µ = µF ,
a contradiction. Hence, µ(f1) = µF (f1), µ(f2) 6= µF (f2), µ(f3) 6= µF (f3), and i2 ∈ W . In
the remainder of the proof we will denote µ = (µ(f1), µ(f2), µ(f3)). Without loss of generality
assume that µ = (w1, w2, w3). Then by µF (f1) = µ(f1) and the assumption that no agent is
single we have µF = (w1, w3, w2).
Next, we consider the case µF (f1) = µ(f1), µF (f2) 6= µ(f2) 6= µW (f2), and µF (f3) 6= µ(f3) 6=
µW (f3).
Since µW (f2) 6= µ(f2), µW (f2) 6= w2. Furthermore, µW (f2) 6= µ(f2) implies µF (f2) Âf2
µW (f2). Thus, µW (f2) 6= w3. Hence, µW (f2) = w1. However, applying the same arguments to
agent f3, we obtain µW (f3) = w1 as well; a contradiction.
Now, the only case7 that remains is µF (f1) = µ(f1) 6= µW (f1) and, without loss of generality,8
µF (f2) 6= µ(f2) = µW (f2), and µF (f3) 6= µ(f3) 6= µW (f3).
Recall that µ = (w1, w2, w3) and µF = (w1, w3, w2). Since µW (f2) = µ(f2) = w2 and
µW (f1) 6= µ(f1) we have µW = (w3, w2, w1).
In fact, S(P )\{µ, µF , µW } = ∅. Suppose not. Let µ′ ∈ S(P )\{µ, µF , µW }. Then µ′ ∈
{(w2, w1, w3), (w2, w3, w1), (w3, w1, w2)}. However, it can easily be checked that in all three
cases µ ∨F µ′ is not a well-defined matching, contradicting Theorem 2.1.
Finally, we calculate the probabilities pµF , pµW , and pµ.
9 Note that after Step 2 of the EL algo-
rithm only 2 agents remain, which hence will be matched to one another. Thus, it suffices to con-
sider the sets Qˆµ, QˆµF , QˆµW , where Qˆµ := {(i1, i2) : there is an agent i3 s.t. (i1, i2, i3) ∈ Qµ}
(the sets QˆµF and QˆµW are defined similarly).
10 One easily verifies that QˆµF = {(f1, f2),
(f1, f3), (f2, f1), (f2, f3), (f2, w1), (f2, w2), (f3, f1), (f3, f2), (f3, w1), (f3, w3)}, QˆµW = {(w1, w2),
(w1, w3), (w1, f1), (w1, f2), (w2, w1), (w2, w3), (w3, w1), (w3, w2), (w3, f2), (w3, f3)}, Qˆµ =
{(f1, w2), (f1, w3), (w2, f1), (w2, f3)}. Thus, |QˆµF | = 10 = |QˆµW | and |Qˆµ| = 4. So,
pµF = pµW =
10
24 =
5
12 and pµ =
4
24 =
2
12 . 2
Next, we consider Conjecture 4.2. Our first remark is that “rank” was not formally defined
by Aldershof et al. (1999). It suggests that the matchings in any lattice can be partitioned in
certain “natural” levels, which is true for many examples of lattices that are used throughout the
literature on the marriage model. The following example demonstrates that this notion of natural
7We already know that µ(f1) = µF (f1), µ(f2) 6= µF (f2), and µ(f3) 6= µF (f3). Now, if µ(fi) = µW (fi) for
some i = 2, 3, then we can assume that µ(fj) 6= µW (fj) for all j 6= i. (Otherwise µ = µW , a contradiction.)
8The roles of f2 and f3 can be switched.
9Recall that for all f , µF (f) ºf µ(f) ºf µW (f). Similarly, for all w, µF (w) ¹w µ(w) ¹w µW (w). Under
the assumptions made in the proof without loss of generality, µF = (w1, w3, w2), µ = (w1, w2, w3), and µW =
(w3, w2, w1). This allows us to conclude that for µ to be reached with positive probability using the EL algorithm,
the agents’ preferences look as follows (by ∗ we indicate possible positions for the firm/worker that is not specified
in the preference lists of some agents):
P (f1) = ∗, w1, ∗, w3, ∗, f1, ∗
P (f2) = ∗, w3, ∗, w2, ∗, f2, ∗
P (f3) = w2, w3, w1, f3
P (w1) = ∗, f3, ∗, f1, ∗, w1, ∗
P (w2) = ∗, f2, ∗, f3, ∗, w2, ∗
P (w3) = f1, f3, f2, w3
10Note that |QˆµF |+ |QˆµW |+ |Qˆµ| = 6 · 4 = 24.
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level/rank is not obvious at all. Given Blair’s (1984) result that every lattice can be obtained
as the set of stable matchings of some matching market, this result is not very surprising. In
addition, the example also shows that even if two stable matchings are incomparable (i.e., the
firms are not unanimous on which of the two is better) they may still have different probabilities
of resulting from employment by lotto.
Example 4.5 Let (F,W,P ) with n = 5 and P listed below.11 The six stable matchings for this
market are listed below as well. We depict the corresponding lattice in Figure 2.
Preferences Stable Matchings
P (f1) = w1 w3 w2 w4 w5 µ1 = w3 w1 w2 w5 w4
P (f2) = w2 w3 w1 w4 w5 µ2 = w3 w1 w2 w4 w5
P (f3) = w3 w2 w1 w4 w5 µ3 = w1 w3 w2 w5 w4
P (f4) = w4 w5 w1 w2 w3 µ4 = w1 w3 w2 w4 w5
P (f5) = w5 w4 w1 w2 w3 µ5 = w1 w2 w3 w5 w4
P (w1) = f2 f1 f3 f4 f5 µ6 = w1 w2 w3 w4 w5
P (w2) = f3 f2 f1 f4 f5
P (w3) = f1 f2 f3 f4 f5
P (w4) = f5 f4 f1 f2 f3
P (w5) = f4 f5 f1 f2 f3
6
4 5
1
/524
/524
/524
/524
/2 24
/2 24
0.208
m
2m
m
m
3m
m
Figure 2: Lattice of Example 4.5
Dotted edges denote incomparability or disagreement on each side of the market. For instance
µ4 · · ·µ5 in Figure 2 means that there is disagreement among the firms (workers) about which
matching is better (for instance, µ5(f2) Âf2 µ4(f2), but µ4(f4) Âf4 µ5(f4)).
The fact that there is no unanimity with respect to matchings µ4 and µ5 and also with
respect to µ2 and µ5, but µ2 → µ4, shows that a natural concept of “rank” is difficult to define.
Moreover, for the two incomparable matchings µ4 and µ5 we have that pµ4 =
2
24 6= 524 = pµ5 . ¦
The following example shows that for n > 3 even if the matchings in a lattice can be
partitioned in natural levels (i.e., the notion of a “rank” can be defined), the function f in
11We complete the preferences of a matching market taken from Blair (1984).
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Conjecture 4.2 needs not be unimodal (by the proof of Theorem 4.4 this part of the conjecture
is true for n ≤ 3).
Example 4.6 Let (F,W,P ) with n = 4 and P listed below. The six stable matchings for this
market are listed below as well. We depict the corresponding lattice in Figure 3.
Preferences Stable Matchings
P (f1) = w1 w2 w4 w3 ν1 = w3 w4 w1 w2
P (f2) = w2 w1 w3 w4 ν2 = w4 w3 w1 w2
P (f3) = w3 w4 w1 w2 ν3 = w4 w1 w3 w2
P (f4) = w4 w3 w1 w2 ν4 = w2 w3 w1 w4
P (w1) = f3 f2 f1 f4 ν5 = w2 w1 w3 w4
P (w2) = f4 f1 f2 f3 ν6 = w1 w2 w3 w4
P (w3) = f1 f2 f3 f4
P (w4) = f2 f1 f4 f3
Since pν2 = pν5 =
2
48 <
5
48 = pν3 = pν4 the function f as defined in Conjecture 4.2 is not
unimodal here. ¦
5
4
4
2
1
6
n
n
3
n
n
n
n
/548
/1748
/1748
/2 48
/2 48
/548
Figure 3: Lattice of Example 4.6
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